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Abstract. Wages – the monetary payments that workers receive from employers in exchange 
for their labour—are widely overlooked in academic and policy debates about human rights 
and business in global supply chains. They shouldn’t be. Just as living wages can insulate 
workers from human rights abuse and labour exploitation, wages that hover around or below 
the poverty line, compounded by illegal practices like wage theft and delayed payment, leave 
workers vulnerable to severe labour exploitation and human rights abuse. This article draws 
on data from a study of global tea and cocoa supply chains to explore the impact of wages on 
one of the most severe human rights abuses experienced in global supply chains, forced 
labour. Demonstrating that low-wage workers experience high vulnerability to forced labour 
in global supply chains, it argues that the role of wages in shaping or protecting workers from 
exploitation needs to be taken far more seriously by scholars and policymakers. When wages 
are ignored, so too is a crucial tool to protect human rights and heighten business 
accountability in global supply chains. 
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Searching for the terms ‘wages’, ‘wage’, and ‘compensation’ within past issues of the Business 
and Human Rights Journal yields no results.1 This illustrates a wider problem. Namely, that 
the burgeoning academic and policy debates about the role, reach, and impact of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) and their responsibility for human rights in global supply chains has 
tended to overlook wages.   
Wages play an important role in preventing workers’ vulnerability to exploitation, as 
well as in deepening and accelerating it. Just as living wages can insulate workers from human 
rights abuse and labour exploitation, wages that hover around or below the poverty line, 
compounded by wage violations like wage theft and delayed payment, leave workers 
vulnerable to severe forms of labour exploitation and human rights abuse. They therefore 
deserve greater attention from scholars and policymakers. 
My mission in this article is to show how important wages are when it comes to shaping 
patterns of vulnerability to one of the most severe forms of labour and human rights abuse 
within global supply chains today, forced labour. Forced labour is defined by the International 
Labour Organization’s (ILO) 1930 Forced Labour Convention as: ‘all work or service which 
is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has 
not offered himself voluntarily’.2 Forced labour is an endemic challenge in global supply chains 
and has been well documented in dozens of industries including garments, electronics, 
agriculture, jewellery, as well as domestic and service work.3  
This article draws on data from my recent study (2016-2019) of global tea and cocoa 
supply chains to explore the impact of wages and wage violations—including sub-minimum 
wages, unlawful deductions from wages, rendering wage payment conditional on involuntary 
                                                      
1 Search conducted 16 October 2020 on Business and Human Rights Journal website, 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-and-human-rights-journal 
2 Forced Labour Convention, International Labour Organisation No. 29 (adopted on 28 June 1930, entered into 
force 1 May 1932), art 2.  
3 For an overview of forced labour in contemporary global supply chains, see: Genevieve LeBaron, Neil 
Howard, Cameron Thibos and Penelope Kyritsis, Confronting Root Causes: Forced Labour in Global Supply 
Chains (Sheffield and London: Sheffield Political Economy Research Institute and openDemcoracy, 2018), 
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/126167/1/Confronting_Root_Causes_Forced_Labour_In_Global_Supply_Chains.
pdf (accessed 30 October 2020). 
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work—  on the dynamics of forced labour.4 One component of this primary dataset includes a 
survey and interviews with around 1,200 tea and cocoa workers in India and Ghana 
respectively focused on wages and working conditions including indicators of forced labour 
(see ‘Research Approach’). Drawing on this data, as well as interviews with business actors, I 
argue that workers facing low wages and wage violations experience high vulnerability to 
forced labour in global supply chains.   
While contemporary policy and academic narratives characterise the employers who 
use forced labour as anomalous criminals5, I highlight that illegally low wages and wage 
violations within global supply chains are not randomly occurring, but rather are traceable to 
commercial practices and pressures. Most crucially, where buyers do not pay suppliers enough 
for products to cover costs of production and margins at the base of supply chains, business 
actors are not able to cover the cost of relevant wage standards (e.g., minimum or living 
wages).6 In both the cocoa and tea supply chains, my data suggests producers’ use of forced 
labour as a cost minimisation strategy is an attempt to manage the price cost squeeze they have 
faced in recent decades as production costs have risen while the prices paid by buyers have 
stagnated or declined. Wages and the human rights abuses they intertwine with, therefore, are 
not isolatable to the individual businesses that employ workers, but rather relate to broader 
business dynamics and relationships along the entire supply chain. 
The close relationship between wages and vulnerability to forced labour in global 
supply chains has important implications for efforts to understand and promote business and 
human rights. While forced labour is often considered a hidden and unpredictable crime, I 
argue here that forced labour is a logical outcome of contemporary business models and supply 
chain dynamics, traceable to stable patterns including those surrounding workers’ earnings and 
wage violations perpetrated by employers. As such, paying better attention to wages and the 
commercial dynamics that shape them can help scholars and policymakers to improve their 
                                                      
4 This article draws on and extends analysis from within a preliminary working paper version of the project 
findings: Genevieve LeBaron, The Global Business of Forced Labour: Report of Findings (Sheffield: SPERI & 
University of Sheffield, 2018). 
5 See for instance: UK Government, UK Government Modern Slavery Statement (available at:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/875800/UK_
Government_Modern_Slavery_Statement.pdf); John Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor and the 
Dark Side of the New Global Economy (New York: Random House, 2007); Kevin Bales and Ron Soodalter, The 
Slave Next Door: Human Trafficking and Slavery in America Today (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009).  
6 Genevieve LeBaron, The Global Business of Forced Labour: Report of Findings (Sheffield: University of 
Sheffield, 2018); Genevieve LeBaron, Combatting Modern Slavery: Why Labour Governance is Failing and 
What We Can Do About It (Cambridge: Polity, 2020).  
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predictions of where forced labour is most likely to occur within global supply chains and 
strengthen efforts to prevent it.  
Tackling low-waged work and wage violations in supply chains is a crucial means of 
addressing more severe forms of human rights abuses.  This has implications for TNCs who 
claim to want to promote human rights within their supply chains, as well as civil society 
organizations, governments, and scholars seeking to heighten business accountability for 
workers in global supply chains.  At present, indicators around wages and the production costs 
that facilitate suppliers to cover minimum wage laws and other wage standards rarely feature 
within tools and initiatives to advance human rights in supply chains. I hope in this article to 
make a case for why they need to be.  
The articles proceeds as follows. Section II situates my conceptual approach within the 
literature on forced labour. Section III describes the research approach taken of my study of 
forced labour in tea and cocoa supply chains. Section IV describes my research findings. 
Section V discusses my findings in the context of business and human rights and reveals the 
importance of wages to several themes animating business and human rights scholarship and 
policy efforts. Section VI concludes and identifies opportunities for future research.   
 
II. FORCED LABOUR IN SUPPLY CHAINS: CRIMINALS OR COMMERCIAL 
PRACTICES? 
In policy documents, academic writing, and journalism, forced labour is often portrayed as an 
aberration within the free market. Described with terms like modern slavery and human 
trafficking, forced labour is depicted as something that arises from criminal perpetrators who 
infiltrate supply chains, rather than linked to core commercial practices within those chains. 
For instance, the UK Government’s 2020 Modern Slavery statement reads, ‘with complex and 
often opaque modern-day supply chains and sub-contracts stretching, tentacle-like, not just 
across the country but around the world, it is all too easy for the unscrupulous and the 
exploitative to take a share… Those behind such crimes, these traders in human misery, must 
and will be ruthlessly hunted down and brought to justice.’7 Forced labour emerges as an 
exceptional result of ‘unscrupulous’ criminal practices, rather than as a logical, predictable 
outcome of the ways in which contemporary supply chains are set up (e.g. highly uneven value 
distribution) and governed (e.g. shareholder primacy of corporations, lacking MNC liability 
                                                      
7 UK Government, UK Government Modern Slavery Statement (available at:  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/875800/UK_
Government_Modern_Slavery_Statement.pdf, p. 1).  
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for labour standards in supply chains). This imaginary—that forced labour is sneaked into 
supply chains by criminals rather than arising within the businesses and dynamics that 
comprise supply chain’s core— is a key reason why the links between everyday business 
practices like wages and forced labour have long been under-investigated.8  
Grasping the importance of wages in shaping patterns of forced labour requires us to 
move beyond several binaries that lie at the heart of prevailing approaches to studying forced 
labour in the global economy. Just as policymakers and scholars tend to see the businesses that 
use forced labour as either criminals or legitimate businesses with nothing in between, much 
of the writing about forced labour also posits a rigid binary between forced labour and the free, 
waged labour that is imagined to comprise employment within global supply chains.9 Several 
assumptions underpin this conceptualisation, but three are especially important for our 
purposes here. First, binary conceptualisations of forced and free labour assume that these are 
fundamentally and ontologically different types of relations, without ontological or analytical 
overlap. Second, they assume that it is feasible and straightforward to isolate modern slavery 
from the labour market and wider relations of work and employment within it; in other words, 
that it is possible to draw a clear-cut line around forced labour and separate it out from the other 
labour relations in a given sector. Third, modern slavery is seen not to involve compensation; 
indeed, scholars tend to assume that if workers are receiving payment or wages of any kind, 
they are not victims of modern slavery. As Kevin Bales puts it, ‘Having just enough money to 
get by, receiving wages that barely keep you alive, may be called wage slavery, but it is not 
slavery.’10 
 The binaries typically posited between forced and free labour have been challenged by 
scholars who have pointed out that there is much greater overlap between the forms of 
unfreedom and abuse associated with forced labour and the ‘free’ labour relations with which 
                                                      
8 See also: Genevieve LeBaron and Andrew Crane, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Business of Forced 
Labour’ in Genevieve LeBaron (ed.), Researching Forced Labour in the Global Economy: Methodological 
Challenges and Advances (Oxford: Oxford University of Press, 2018) 25; Andrew Crane, ‘Modern Slavery as a 
Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and Capabilities for Human Exploitation’ (2013) 38:1 Academy 
of Management Review 49. 
9 See for instance: Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004); Siddharth Kara, Modern Slavery: A Global Perspective (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2017); John Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor and the Dark Side of the New 
Global Economy (New York: Random House, 2007); Kevin Bales and Ron Soodalter, The Slave Next Door: 
Human Trafficking and Slavery in America Today (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).  
10 Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004), p. 5.  
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forced labour is typically juxtaposed.11 Not only do workers within free labour relations often 
confront more minor forms of abuse and exploitation, but forced labour in the global economy 
often fails to conform to the dramatic, sensationalist accounts of it offered by scholars and 
policymakers.12 More often than not, the forms of labour exploitation and abuse that workers 
confront in global supply chains are messy rather than clear-cut instances of forced labour, 
difficult to demarcate, and change over time. As Stephanie Barrientos, Uma Kothari, and 
Nicola Phillips put it, ‘in a nutshell, it is increasingly evident that contemporary labour relations 
cannot in any useful sense be positioned on one side or other of a clear dividing line between 
‘free’ and ‘unfree’ labour’.13 This insight has shaped and underpinned my research approach 
to investigating forced labour, including the data presented in this article. 
 I have also been guided by empirical research that demonstrates that contrary to 
dominant portrayals, victims of forced labour often do receive some form of compensation or 
wage; only rarely are they completely unpaid, as is commonly claimed in the modern slavery 
literature. For instance, in a study I conducted jointly with Jean Allain, Andrew Crane, and 
Laya Behbahani of forced labour in the cannabis, construction, and food industries in the 
United Kingdom14, we documented variations in the business models of forced labour, 
including how they differed with respect to wages paid to victims. While in some business 
models focused on cost minimisation, workers in forced labour were not paid at all, in other 
business models focused on cost minimisation and revenue generation through forced labour, 
we found that victims of forced labour are receiving some form of wage. And furthermore, we 
found that wages are an important means of creating and maintaining the conditions of forced 
labour, so require further study.  
                                                      
11 Genevieve LeBaron, Combatting Modern Slavery: Why Labour Governance is Failing and What We Can Do 
About It (Cambridge: Polity, 2020); Jens Lerche, ‘A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour? Unfree Labour, 
Neo-Liberal Globalization and the International Labour Organization’ (2007) 7:4 Journal of Agrarian Change, 
425; Stephanie Barrientos, Uma Kothari, and Nicola Phillips, ‘Dynamics of Unfree Labour in the Contemporary 
Global Economy’ (2013) 49:8 The Journal of Development Studies, 1037; Nicola Phillips, ‘Unfree Labour and 
Adverse Incorporation in the Global Economy: Comparative Perspectives on Brazil and India’ (2013) 42:2 
Economy and Society, 171.  
12 See, for instance: Genevieve LeBaron, ‘Unfree Labour Beyond Binaries: Insecurity, Social Hierarchy and 
Labour Market Restructuring,’ (2015) 17:1, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 1; Laura Brace and Julia 
O’Connell Davidson (eds), Revisiting Slavery and Anti-Slavery: Towards a Critical Analysis (London: 
Palgrave, 2018).  
13 Stephanie Barrientos, Uma Kothari, and Nicola Phillips, ‘Dynamics of Unfree Labour in the Contemporary 
Global Economy’ (2013) 49:8 The Journal of Development Studies, p. 1038. 
14 Jean Allain, Andrew Crane, and Laya Behbahani, Forced Labour’s Business Models and Supply Chains 
(York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2013).  
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For instance, we found that businesses used forced labour to generate revenue, both 
through charging workers for ancillary services (e.g. accommodation, food) and through 
benefit theft (e.g. leveraging control over workers and claiming entitlements from the 
government on their behalf). As well, as businesses sought to reduce costs of employment 
through coercion, they tended to systematically underpay workers. Across almost all of the 
business models of forced labour that we identified within the research, wages were a key part 
of the picture.  Deductions from wages, underpayment and theft of wages, and bypassing wage 
controls (such as via bogus self-employment schemes) were all fundamental components 
through which forced labour was manifesting in these supply chains. Our research, and other 
recent studies that similarly confirm that wages can indeed be present in forced labour 
situations, underscores the complexity and inconsistency surrounding compensation and forced 
labour and the need to overcome theoretical assumptions that equate payment with freedom.15  
Such recognition has shaped previous research on forced labour in India’s tea 
plantations. Research by scholars like Deepak Mishra, Sharit K. Bhowmik, and Rana Behal 
has documented the forms of indentured servitude, forced migration, forced labour, and labour 
exploitation that have long characterised the tea industry in India.16 These studies have charted 
the blurry line between forced labour and more minor forms of exploitation and how it has 
evolved over time as colonial power relations and legal use of bonded labour gave way to 
contemporary restrictions on employers’ use of bondage and coercion. As K. Ravi Raman 
describes, ‘The distinction drawn between slavery and the actual conditions of work that 
existed on plantations was so subtle as to escape the comprehension of the harassed workers—
so intensive and painful was the ill-treatment meted out to them.’17 This body of research 
underscores that the core businesses comprising the Indian tea industry often use illegal labour 
practices; in other words, coercion is not the result of sly criminals penetrating supply chains, 
                                                      
15 See also: Nicola Phillips, ‘Unfree Labour and Adverse Incorporation in the Global Economy: Comparative 
Perspectives on Brazil and India’ (2013) 42:2 Economy and Society, 171;  Louise Waite, Gary Craig, Hannah 
Lewis, and Klara Skrivankova (eds), Vulnerability, Exploitation and Migrants: Insecure Work in a Globalised 
Economy (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2015); Alessandra Mezzadri, The Sweatshop 
Regime: Labouring Bodies, Exploitation and Garments Made in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017).   
16 Rana P. Behal, One Hundred Years of Servitude: Political Economy of Tea Plantations in Colonial Assam 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Deepak K. Mishra, Vandana Upadhyay, and Atul Sarma, 
Unfolding Crisis in Assam’s Tea Plantations: Employment and Occupational Mobility (New Delhi: Routledge, 
2012); Sharit K. Bhomik, ‘Ethnicity and Isolation: Marginalization of Tea Plantation Workers,’ (2011) 4:2, 
Race/Ethnicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts, 235.  
17 K. Ravi Raman, Bondage in Freedom: Colonial Plantations in Southern India c. 1797-1947 (Working Paper 
No. 327, Centre for Development Studies Thiruvananthapuram).   
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but rather, a strategy implemented by employers to make their businesses more profitable 
amidst lacking regulation and regulatory enforcement. 
Previous research on forced labour in Ghana’s cocoa industry has similarly drawn 
attention to the complexities and overlaps that surround forced labour and labour practices in 
the cocoa industry more broadly. While scholars within the modern slavery literature, anti-
slavery organizations, and policymakers continue to decry the modern ‘chocolate slaves’ of 
West Africa and the criminals who exploit them18, other currents of scholarship have explored 
the complex history of slavery and unfree labour in the cocoa industry since the 19th century 
and the considerable overlaps that have exist between these and more minor forms of 
exploitation.19 Just like studies of tea, scholarship on forced, child, trafficked and exploited 
labour in cocoa demonstrates the futility and limits of binary thinking, both when it comes to 
labour and in relation to the businesses that operate in mostly legal ways but sometimes enact 
coercive and illegal labour practices.  
Much of the literature on labour relations in Indian tea and Ghanaian cocoa production 
has been written by historians, anthropologists, and sociologists who have been interested in 
documenting the granular relations that have occurred on plantations and farms, especially the 
life histories, experiences, and stories of the workers that have produced tea and cocoa. This 
rich body of scholarship has shed light into the labour relations that have characterised 
commodity production, and to some extent, give insight into contemporary labour practices as 
well. But it leaves several important questions that arise from a political science perspective on 
business and human rights in supply chains unanswered. For instance, what are the patterns 
that surround the use of illegal labour practices by business? Is forced labour more likely to 
occur on some types of worksites or within some types of supply chains rather than others? 
How exactly do wages fit into the picture of contemporary forced labour? And how do supply 
chain dynamics linking back to MNCs shape conditions on worksites at the bottom of the 
chain? These questions have shaped my inquiry, both in this article and in the wider research 
projects that have informed it. By understanding the business models of forced labour and how 
wages and wage practices fit into these models, we can advance the literature on forced labour 
and strengthen approaches to combatting it.  
                                                      
18 See, for instance, End Slavery Now, ‘The “Chocolate Slaves” of the Ivory Coast’, available online: 
https://www.endslaverynow.org/blog/articles/the-chocolate-slaves-of-the-ivory-coast 
19 Kwabena O Akurang-Parry, ‘“The Loads Are Heavier than Usual”: Forced Labor by Women and Children in 
the Central Province, Gold Coast (Colonial Ghana), CA 1900-1940’, (2002), 30:30, African Economic History, 
31; Amanda Berlan, ‘Social Sustainability in Agriculture: An Anthropological Perspective on Child Labour,’ 
(2016), 49:8, The Journal of Development Studies, 1088; Carol Off, Bitter Chocolate: Anatomy of an Industry 




III. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The data discussed below comes from an original dataset that I led an international team to 
collect through my Global Business of Forced Labour project (2016-2019, funded by the UK 
Economic and Social Research Council). This research systematically mapped the global 
business of forced labour in tea and cocoa supply chains focusing on tea production in two 
regions of India and cocoa production in two regions of Ghana.20 We used a variety of 
qualitative and quantitative methods to collect and analyse our data. The project’s methodology 
has already been published elsewhere and is too extensive to fully elaborate in this brief article, 
so I offer here a brief description of our data and the data collection techniques we used to 
generate it.21  
 
A. Data Collection 
Primary data collection for the Global Business of Forced Labour project involved several 
strands of research, including: pilot studies; a survey and interviews with 597 tea workers 
across 22 tea plantations in India; a survey and interviews with 557 cocoa workers across 74 
cocoa communities in Ghana; interviews with 25 domestic business actors, including tea 
plantation and cocoa farm owners and managers, buyers, packagers, exporters, and industry 
associations; interviews with 19 international business actors including executives of TNCs 
and certification and auditing firms; interviews with 28 government and international 
organisation officials; interviews with 40 experts from academia, civil society, and trade unions 
(see Table 1). As well, the project made use of secondary data to map and analyse the global 
tea and cocoa supply chains and business characteristics. The research team was made up of 
myself, a postdoctoral research fellow, and twelve experienced in-country research assistants, 
most of whom were PhD candidates at Indian or Ghanaian universities at the time of the 
research. 
The first phase of our research was desk based, and used secondary company, industry, 
and supply chain data obtained through Factset, the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, and 
other sources to map cocoa and tea supply chains and analyse the socioeconomic contexts in 
which businesses and workers are situated along the chain. We then conducted two field-based 
pilot studies to generate insights into the overall patterns of forced labour and overlapping 
                                                      
20 For information on this project, see: http://globalbusinessofforcedlabour.ac.uk/. 
21 LeBaron (2018), note 4. 
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forms of abuse and exploitation in both industries, which informed the approach and 
substantive focus taken in our larger scale interviews and surveys, and confirmed the suitability 
of our strategy for sampling and site selection.  
 Following the pilot studies, the third phase of our research focused on tea plantations 
in two regions of India, Assam and Kerala, selected because of their significance to global trade 
in tea, and due to their differences in wage levels, regulatory environment, and economic 
development. We constructed samples for surveys (N = 536) and in-depth interviews (N=61) 
with tea workers in a structured and random way. To ensure variation (e.g., across businesses’ 
ownership models, product destination, distance from city), we used data gathered in our pilot 
study to create a list of plantations and then broke this down into categories. Using a random 
number generator, we selected plantations from each category, and eventually produced a list 
of 22 plantations on which to focus our research with tea workers. We developed a mixed 
quantitative and qualitative survey in Kobo Toolbox, a free open-source tool for mobile data 
collection developed by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, focused on: working and living 
conditions; wages, credit and debt; productivity quotas; and costs of living; and indicators of 
forced labour. Local researchers trained by our research team undertook the worker survey in 
workers’ languages and uploaded the geo-referenced data through Kobo. Interviews lasted 
between 45-95 minutes, were simultaneously interpreted, audio recorded, and transcribed by a 
local transcription firm with necessary language skills to verify the translations. The interviews 
with workers generated both qualitative and quantitative information, using a semi-structured 
interview guide to gather information about wages, deductions made from pay, credit and loan 
dynamics with money lenders and managers, costs of living, as well as working and living 
conditions in the tea industry. Following the worker interviews, and after a period of participant 
observation and immersion, interviews were conducted with business actors (N=13) including 
plantation managers and tea industry association representatives to collect financial data about 
tea plantation business models, including their revenue and cost structures. Finally, government 
officials were interviewed to understand the challenges and opportunities for enforcing labour 
standards on these plantations. By collecting and triangulating data across these sources, this 
component of our research gives us traction to understand the patterns of why, when, and how 
forced labour is being used by tea producers. 
 In phase four of our research, we deployed similar methods to investigate the patterns 
of forced labour in the cocoa industry based in two regions of Ghana, Ashanti and Western 
regions. These regions were selected because of their importance to the global cocoa industry, 
as well as the differences in the demographics of their workforces and issues around trafficking 
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and forced labour identified in previous research. We had initially planned to replicate the 
structured, random approach to sample construction that we had used in India; however, we 
were unable to do so because there was no available and comprehensive registry of cocoa 
communities and growers. Our team worked with agricultural extension officers from Ghana 
Cocoa Board, Cocobod, as well as data from the Ghana Statistical Service to create our own 
list of cocoa districts for each region. We used purposive sampling to select a diverse array of 
districts (e.g., varying proximity to major cities, diverse workforce demographics including 
proportion of migrant workers, and poverty) within each region. Smallholder farmers are the 
main producers of cocoa in Ghana; they are grouped into cocoa communities, and the leaders 
of these communities must grant permission and facilitate a process of community entry before 
research can begin. We observed these customs. Agricultural extension officers for the districts 
provided us with information on the cocoa communities within their districts, as well as the 
farmers who sell to large, ethically certified cocoa-growing cooperatives in the region, broken 
down by community. We selected communities with the help of local academics and the 
agricultural extension officers, seeking to create a balance between different types of farm. 
From there, we were able to replicate the process for data collection outlined above to 
undertake a worker survey (N=497 workers across 74 cocoa communities), worker interviews 
(N=60 workers), and business interviews (N=12), with a few minor differences. One was that 
the interviews were held on cocoa farms since unlike on tea plantations, managers were not 
present on the farms, so there was no danger of retaliation. As well, due to the differences 
between the tea and cocoa industry structures, our interviews with local business actors 
included licensed buying companies, farm owners, certifiers, and processors to gather 
information on the cocoa business as a whole. Collecting and triangulating across these sources 
gives us considerable traction to understand the patterns of why, when and how forced labour 
is being used by cocoa producers. 
 Once our research at the base of the tea and cocoa supply chains was complete, we 
moved our way up the chain to interview international business representatives, government, 
international organisation officials, and other experts (N=119) with first-hand knowledge of 
company and industry practices and the effectiveness of existing public and private initiatives  
to combat forced labour in global tea and cocoa supply chains. Interviews were semi-
structured, conducted in English, and lasted around an hour. They were transcribed by a UK-
based firm. Taken together, this body of interviews sheds light into the practical and 
jurisdictional challenges of governing labour standards in global supply chains, enforcement 
gaps and obstacles that allow forced labour at the base of supply chains to occur with 
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widespread impunity.  Table 1 and 2 summarize the groups of interviews that are most relevant 
to this article.  
 
-------------------TABLE 1 AND 2 GO HERE------------------ 
   
B. Data Analysis 
We analysed the worker survey and interview data using Kobo, Excel, and NVivo 11. First, 
the worker interview transcripts were coded in NVivo, with one team member coding the entire 
dataset to ensure quality and consistency, using content, thematic, and discourse analysis. 
Worker interviews transcripts were coded in a two-part process involving deductive and 
inductive codes. Second, after viewing survey results in Kobo, we cleaned the data and 
undertook analysis in Excel. Third, we coded transcripts of interviews with elite actors by hand, 
using a thematic coding framework derived inductively from codes and themes emerging in 
the data. Finally, we triangulated across our data to systematise our narrative, thematic, content, 




Our research finds that – in contrast to dominant portrayals of forced labour as a randomly 
occurring crime and perpetrated by individual criminals22— forced labour arises within 
businesses and supply chains according to stable, predictable patterns.23  One of the patterns 
uncovered by our research on tea and cocoa supply chains is that workers earning low, sub-
poverty line wages and experiencing wage violations from employers have high vulnerability 
to forced labour. In other words, working in an industry where low wages and more minor 
forms of exploitation are endemic is a key factor that renders workers vulnerable to more severe 
forms of exploitation, including forced labour.  
                                                      
22 John Bowe, Nobodies: Modern American Slave Labor and the Dark Side of the New Global Economy (New 
York: Random House, 2007); Kevin Bales and Ron Soodalter, The Slave Next Door: Human Trafficking and 
Slavery in America Today (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). 
23 See also: Genevieve LeBaron and Andrew Crane, ‘Methodological Challenges in the Business of Forced 
Labour’ in Genevieve LeBaron (ed.), Researching Forced Labour in the Global Economy: Methodological 
Challenges and Advances (Oxford: Oxford University of Press, 2018) 25; Andrew Crane, ‘Modern Slavery as a 
Management Practice: Exploring the Conditions and Capabilities for Human Exploitation’ (2013) 38:1 Academy 
of Management Review 49; Andrew Crane, Genevieve LeBaron, Jean Allain and Laya Behbahani, ‘Governance 







A. How Low Wages and Wage Violations Can Lead to Forced Labour 
The patterns of forced labour in tea and cocoa supply chains need to be situated within broader 
patterns of labour exploitation and remuneration within these industries. Our research found 
that wages, working, and living conditions tend to fall far below the minimum standards set by 
governments, companies, and ethical certification organizations, and that workers move 
between more minor forms of labour exploitation and human rights abuse and very severe ones 
in relatively short periods of time.  
 Workers in both tea and cocoa industries are protected by legal minimum wage 
standards, and some workers are also and additionally covered by even higher wage standards 
set by various voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) and ethical certification schemes 
relevant to the tea and cocoa supply chains. Nevertheless, our research found that wages across 
both tea and cocoa workers are very low, and fall well below the poverty line which in Ghana 
and India is approximately UK£2.35 per day. In India, the average daily wage for a tea worker 
was as low as 25 per cent of the poverty line amount and in Ghana, cocoa worker wages were 
around 30 per cent of the poverty line amount. 
Relevant legal minimum wages for tea workers in India at the time of our research 
were the tea worker minimum wage rates of ₹137 (~£1.39) in Assam and ₹257 (~£2.61) in 
Kerala and national minimum wage rate for unskilled agricultural workers of ₹250 (~£2.50). 
However, in practice, employers use a quota system that determines wages according to the 
amount of tea plucked each day. In Assam, tea workers report that quota targets range 
between 15 and 30 kgs of tea per day, while in Kerala these range from 21 to 27 kgs of tea 
per day.  
When workers fail to meet these targets, deductions are made from their daily wages, 
and in some cases, wages are withheld altogether.24 As one worker explained, ‘During the 
season we have to pluck 25 kg of tea leaves per day and if this is not fulfilled we are not 
given wages.’25 Another noted that workers only receive half of their wages if they fail to 
meet the target.26 For other workers, deductions from wages are made if they fail to meet 
quotas. One explained, ‘In the case of plucking, if the 27 kg is not fulfilled then ₹5 per kg is 
deducted.’27 Managers confirmed that the practice of reducing workers’ wages where quotas 
                                                      
24 Tea workers 1 and 30.  
25 Tea worker 1.  
26 Tea worker 4. 
27 Tea worker 45. 
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aren’t met is common. One told us, ‘Lazy workers don’t get paid the same as hard workers. 
The company takes their wages away if they are lazy.’28   
Workers also reported that wage violations—including miscalculation of earnings, 
fraudulent deductions and fees—are common. Several workers explained that managers 
miscalculate their wages by misrepresenting the weight of the tea they have picked. One 
explained:  
 
Suppose the workers are plucking 50 kg, but the amount of 6 or 5 kg is deducted from 
the total. We are watching the weighing machine and say to the manager, no, it is this other 
amount. But then we are scolded or threatened saying that we are speaking too much, and our 
work will be stopped if we do that.29  
 
In the high season, the average tea picked per worker per day amounted to 81 kg, with 
a maximum of 150 kg per day. However, employers frequently make deductions from wages 
so that workers do not receive their full wage. One worker explained, ‘there are a lot of 
deductions in the salary. Nearly 50 per cent of the salary is cut and with the remaining salary, 
we are not able to survive.’30 The most commonly reported deductions made by employers 
were for services that employers are legally required to provide to workers for free (e.g., 
medical facilities) or for services that workers were charged for but were not provided (e.g., 
electricity). Over 40 per cent of workers reported unfair deductions from their wages. Some 
explained that their employers used wage deductions as punishments for speaking out against 
unfair treatment. As one told us, ‘The supervisor sometimes used to abuse the workers. If he 
was asked why he abused, then the supervisor would reduce our salaries.’31  
Within the cocoa industry, we found similar patterns around low wages and the 
endemic underpayment of wages. At the time of our research, the National Daily Minimum 
Wage in Ghana was GH₵8.80 (~£1.13), but in practice, we found that the average income for 
a cocoa worker is GH₵1880 per year, or just GH₵5.15 (~£0.66) per day.  By comparison, a 
living wage for a cocoa worker would be GH₵47 (~£6.06) per day. In other words, cocoa 
workers are earning roughly 1/10th of the amount they would need to cover basic necessities. 
                                                      
28 Manager 3.  
29 Tea worker 5.  
30 Tea worker 55 
31 Tea worker 42.  
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Workers reported similar patterns of wage violations as in the tea industry, including: 
not being paid for all of the work performed; predatory and fraudulent deductions for 
equipment, fertiliser, pesticides, food, or transportation (including for items which were never 
actually provided); the imposition of fines or deductions leading to ‘nnaho’ or involuntary 
labour; the imposition of fees for securing a job as a farm worker; the non-payment of wages 
altogether. Around 23 per cent of workers in our study reported having performed work they 
were not paid for. As one worker described, ‘I did work for someone and the person 
promised to pay me upon completion, but it’s been over two months now and I am still yet to 
be paid. The amount is about GH₵900 but he paid me GH₵240 from that so he owes me 
GH₵660.’32 Workers also noted that farm owners pay less than promised for work 
performed, and keep their wages for themselves.33 In addition, they reported that the practice 
of charging workers fees to obtain a job in the cocoa industry is widespread, and that they are 
regularly forced to perform unpaid labour (say, on the cocoa farm owner’s private land) as a 
condition of their employment in the cocoa industry.   
In the face of these dynamics, the wage payments workers receive are so low that many 
workers explained they effectively earn no money from cocoa farming over the course of a 
season since their earnings (in the form of cocoa beans and wages) are spent paying off debts, 
fines, and/or deductions imposed by employers and lenders, often as practices of debt bondage. 
As one worker explained, ‘Even the little that you sell the cocoa for, by the time you 
finish…then basically you’re left with almost nothing.’34  
In both cocoa and tea, low wages compounded by wage violations leave workers with 
insufficient take-home pay to cover basic expenses like food, school fees, and medical care. 
Of the tea workers in our study, 54 per cent reported having gone into debt, with the amount 
of money borrowed ranging from ₹200 to ₹100,000 and an average interest of ₹7,296. A high 
proportion of workers are charged usurious interest rates on these loans (as measured against 
the Usurious Loans Act of 1918 and Interest Act of 1978), which leaves them highly 
vulnerable to situations of debt bondage. An even higher amount – 59 per cent of tea workers 
– reported having no savings. Similarly, in cocoa, 60 per cent of the workers in our study 
report having gone into debt, and the average loan taken out by workers was GH₵690. 
Interest rates among cocoa workers varied, but were frequently 100 per cent of the amount 
loaned. As one worker explained:  
                                                      
32 Cocoa worker 42 
33 Cocoa workers 7 and 50. 




Although I need the money to save my child’s life I am forced to borrow the money 
and pay 100 per cent interest rate. I usually do that once cocoa season is in session at the end 
of the year. Once I get money from the cocoa proceeds then I can pay.35  
 
Compounding the patterns of wage underpayment, wage deductions, and indebtedness, 
workers reported that they often experience violent treatment, threats, coercion, and gender-
based violence by employers. One cocoa worker explained, ‘there is violence, physical assault 
by farm owners, they will beat up their farm workers and they come back later and apologise 
for their behaviour.’36 Another cocoa worker described that their employer became violent 
when wages were due to be paid: ‘They sometimes don’t pay you on time and when they know 
it is time to pay you that is when they pick up a fight with you.’37 Tea workers described similar 
patterns, noting that employers enact violent treatment, threats, and coercion. One worker 
described how these practices can be used as a tool of labour discipline, as employers 
increasingly use the threat of underpayment to enact higher productivity from workers: ‘Now 
when we work and get tired if we rest a little the management people come and scold us telling 
that they will cut their wage. Earlier it was not like this.’38   
Our study included over a dozen measures of labour and human rights abuse for 
workers in each industry, and found most of them to be incredibly widespread. Not all of these 
conditions reach the narrow threshold of the ILO’s definition of forced labour. But we found 
that forced labour becomes difficult to disentangle from the routine forms of more minor 
exploitation and underpayment that workers experience as a norm. Indeed, because most 
workers in the cocoa and tea industries move in and out of forced labour and more minor forms 
of abuse in relatively short periods of time, forced labour can be tricky to isolate. As such, it is 
a porous rather than rigid category.   
We found that it often took just one contingency – a worker having a heart attack, 
needing more food to feed a growing family, or a child becoming ill—to push a worker from 
regularized hardship of wage underpayment and deductions and debt into severe forms of 
forced labour. Crucially, the event or circumstance that can cause a worker to cross the 
threshold from generalised poor conditions into conditions of forced labour can be relatively 
                                                      
35 Cocoa worker 36. 
36 Cocoa worker 61. 
37 Cocoa worker 47.  
38 Tea worker 28. 
 
 17 
arbitrary. Because the dynamics surrounding low wages and wage deductions mean that most 
workers have little to no savings, when emergencies arise, workers borrow money from 
whomever will lend it to them. This is often a manager or employer, who charges high interest 
rates. Workers within our study regularly reported being charged interest rates of 100 per cent.   
In a context where wages are low and in-work poverty is the norm, more often than not, 
debt pushes workers into severe debt bondage that falls within the ILO definition of forced 
labour. In a cyclical manner, wage underpayment—and the fees, deductions, and fines that 
facilitate it—pushed workers into persistent borrowing at high interest rates. These debts then 
push workers into worse working conditions as employers and creditors use debt to leverage 
even greater control over them and impose lower pay and worse conditions (e.g. more 
involuntary unpaid labour to repay debts) onto workers.  
Forced labour arises in these industries not as an isolated practice and anomalous crime, 
but rather as something that is anchored in and intertwined with the general working conditions 
within a given portion of the supply chain. Working in an industry where wages are very low 
and where more minor forms of abuse and exploitation are rampant creates systematic 
vulnerability to forced labour. Individuals and families face pronounced risks on top of this 
generalised vulnerability when continencies and emergencies arise that they cannot cover 
through their very low earnings. In both the tea and cocoa industries, low wages combined with 
limited access to justice, constraints on the ability to exert labour rights, and little to no 
alternative means of making a living leave workers highly vulnerable to forced labour. 
 
B. The Link Between Low Wages and Commercial Practices 
Low wages, labour exploitation, and forced labour among cocoa and tea producer workforces 
do not arise spontaneously in supply chains. Rather, these clear and stable patterns are traceable 
to business models and commercial dynamics.  
 Input costs have risen for tea producers over recent decades, especially when it comes 
to worker wages and climate change mitigation.39 Tea plantation owners emphasised the 
difficult business environment tea producers are operating within. Rising costs combined with 
declining global and buyer prices for tea has left businesses struggling to stay afloat. One 
described: 
 
                                                      
39
 Genevieve LeBaron, The Global Business of Forced Labour: Report of Findings (Sheffield: SPERI & 
University of Sheffield, 2018). 
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If you are a plantation owner, labour is 80-85 per cent of your cost of doing business. 
At the moment, prices of inputs are going up (machinery, petrol, diesel, and labour). And 
gardens are getting paid less for the tea they grow. Margins are tight for growers. All of the 
money is in packaging, processing, and marketing. Rising labour prices are having a huge 
impact—some gardens are no longer economically viable.40  
 
In addition to the rising wage standards that producers need to cover, amidst climate 
change, weather is another key factor increasing costs of production. Producers reported that 
climate change has reduced the amount of rain during key parts of the growing season, and 
they have had to cover the cost of larger and larger amounts of water. At the same time, more 
severe and frequent flooding during other parts of the year has created an urgent need for new 
infrastructure and irrigation. 
At the same time, top-down forces like corporate consolidation in the tea industry, the 
growing power of buyers, and global price pressures from emerging, lower-cost tea markets 
(such as in Kenya) and financialisation and trade patterns within commodity markets, combine 
to exert downward pressure on tea prices.41 According to data from the Tea Board of India, tea 
plantations are selling tea at rates that most years barely cover their steeply rising costs of 
production, and some years, do not even fully stretch to cover production costs at all.42 Selling 
tea at or below costs of production has a significant impact on wages, working, and living 
conditions on tea estates; because labour costs comprise such a major expense for tea 
producers, cost minimization strategies almost always seek to reduce the cost of labour, which 
is what leads to coherent patterns of underpayment, fraud, and overlapping forms of abuse.  
 In the cocoa industry, we found similar patterns. Cocoa farm owners tied low wages 
and labour abuse to increasingly slim margins in cocoa. They explained that in recent years, 
some seasons have not been profitable at all due to bushfires, weather conditions, pests, and 
the rising costs and disappearing government subsidies for fertiliser and pesticides, and they 
are barely breaking even. One farmer reported earning GH₵5,000 a year for his cocoa, noting 
that from this, he pays at least GH₵1,000 for day labour, and much of the rest is spent on 
costs of production. Ultimately, in a good year, he only earns around GH₵1,500 a year 
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(approximately UK£244) from his cocoa farm, which he uses to support himself and his 
family and repay debts from bad years. He explained this is inadequate to live a comfortable 
life, ‘because the expenses that I made for the year, and concerning my family, the income of 
1,500 is not enough for me but I have to manage with that money.’43  Cocoa prices are 
affected by a multiplicity of forces, including the downward pressure exerted by large 
companies, the prices set by national cocoa boards, trading and speculation, and fluctuations 
in the British Pound and US dollar. But trade data confirms the price cost squeeze identified 
by Ghanaian producers; while Ghanaian producer costs have steadily risen over the last 
decade, the price of cocoa has declined.44  These commercial pressures have important 
impacts on farmers’ labour practices, driving a turn towards more casualized labour over the 
longer-term workforces that have been common in the industry as well as pressures towards 
cost minimisation through various forms of forced labour.45 
  Simply put, cocoa and tea producers’ demand for exploited labour is contextualised by 
the low prices they receive for their products within supply chains. Forced labour—and the low 
wages, wage violations, and other forms of exploitation that are entangled with and give rise 
to it—emerge as a strategy to cut costs and earn revenue in the face of severe commercial 
pressures that originate from much larger and more powerful businesses towards the top of the 
supply chain.  
These commercial pressures are not unique to the cocoa and tea industries, but have 
been well documented across several industries and supply chains, where it is common for 
buyers to source goods at prices below the costs of production. For instance, a recent ILO 
survey undertaken in collaboration with the joint Ethical Trading Initiatives that covered 1,454 
suppliers across 87 countries found that 39 per cent of suppliers accept orders below the costs 
of production, only 25 per cent of buyers were willing to increase prices to accommodate 
minimum wage increases.46  Further research is needed to establish how, when, and why these 
practices impact wages and patterns of forced labour across different types of supply chains 
and parts of the world. But it is clear that media accounts that describe forced labour as arising 
from immoral criminals seeking to amass vast profits through human rights abuse are simplistic 
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and misleading. More often than not, forced labour in supply chains is traceable to business 
models shaped by commercial practices of TNCs further up the supply chain.  
 
 
V. DISCUSSION: WAGES: A FORGOTTEN DIMENSION OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS? 
 
Wages have not always been ignored within conversations about business and human rights. 
Indeed, in scholarship on TNC responsibility for sweatshops in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
concerns about business responsibility for wages and the forms of labour exploitation 
associated with low-waged work were central. For instance, Edna Bonacich and Richard P. 
Appelbaum’s influential book, Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los Angeles Apparel 
Industry published in the year 2000 identifies higher profits for TNCs and lower wages for 
supply chain workers as one of the key innovations behind the reorganisation of manufacturing 
into global supply chains. As they describe, ‘It is out of such a system of contracting out that 
the sweatshop is born. What provides wonderful flexibility for the manufacturer provides 
unstable work, impoverishment, and often abusive conditions for the workers.’47 However, as 
the field of business and human rights scholarship has evolved as an independent field of 
inquiry, wages and their multi-faceted links to working conditions and human rights abuses 
seem to have largely fallen off the map.  
 Although there is a voluminous literature on business responsibility for human rights 
and the mechanisms through which these can be realised and enforced in global supply chains 
– including legislation, CSR, international organisation guidelines, and lawsuits— it is rare to 
come across analysis of the role of wages in protecting supply chain workers from human rights 
abuse, or enabling their vulnerability to it. This isn’t to suggest that wages are entirely absent 
from analysis; there is passing and implicit mention of wages where scholars note the 
importance of ‘economic and physical subsistence’48, the economic security of rights holders, 
or upholding social security through welfare states, including through living wages.49 But a 
                                                      
47 Edna Bonacich and Richard P. Appelbaum, Behind the Label: Inequality in the Los Angeles Apparel Industry 
(Berkeley: University of California Press), 13.  
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clear explanation for how and why wages relate to patterns of human rights abuse and business 
responsibility in global supply chains is sorely lacking. 
 Several strands of the business and human rights literature could be strengthened 
through a more explicit focus on wages and the commercial practices and business models that 
shape wage dynamics. One strand is scholarship on TNCs and human rights. Most of the 
attention within this strand of research of late has focused on: the conditions under which TNCs 
have human rights obligations or not; how far those responsibilities extend within supply 
chains; the role of various actors including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), banks, 
regulators, businesses, and rights holders in enacting and enforcing these obligations; and the 
utility and procedural effectiveness of various tools to help them do so, ranging from human 
rights benchmarks to modern slavery legislation.50 This body of work has helpfully drawn 
attention to the trend of national governments seeking to enact the United Nations Guiding 
Principles and address public pressure to eradicate forced labour and child labour from global 
supply chains through a wave of ‘home state’ regulation, including human rights due diligence 
and modern slavery legislation.51  This has been complimented by multilateral and international 
organisation efforts, such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains and the ILO, International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), OECD and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
efforts to ‘inform public and business policies and practices in order to prevent child labour, 
forced labour and human trafficking in global supply chains.’52  
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A parallel and at times overlapping strand of the business and human rights literature 
focuses on the rights of workers, with scholars highlighting challenges in ensuring rights for 
workers vulnerable to abuse, including refugees and migrant workers53, and across various 
supply chains including garments, electronics, hospitality, and the gig economy.54 These 
studies are beginning to explore the links between employment practices and human rights, 
and pinpoint the need for further research including through methods that prioritise workers 
and their input, since it has generally been absent from discussions about business and human 
rights to date.55    
Both areas of research would be significantly strengthened through a focus on wages. 
Human rights for workers within global supply chains depend on more equitable forms of value 
distribution, suppliers earning sufficient income that they can cover the costs of relevant wage 
standards, and mechanisms to ensure that the right amount of money actually ends up in 
workers’ pockets. Although this is a basic point, it is too often forgotten in discussions about 
business and human rights. An explicit focus on wages would mean measuring and enforcing 
several components of business and human rights in supply chains differently. I will mention 
just five here. 
 
A. Benchmarking 
There are dozens of metrics and benchmarks to assess Environment, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) factors which typically include human rights across investment and 
company performance. Oddly, almost none of these benchmarks include metrics around costs 
of production and the payment of living wages in supply chains, in spite of the fact that workers 
and their advocacy organisations have now developed several tools to benchmark purchasing 
practices and their impact upon wages.56 Ensuring that minimum and living wages are paid is 
a basic but fundamental and structural pre-condition to eradicating forced labour in supply 
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chains, so if ESG benchmarks are to be effective in relation to forced labour and overlapping 
forms of exploitation, they need to encompass these metrics. 
 
B. Debt  
Business and human rights scholarship has identified the importance of debt in 
facilitating the labour exploitation and mobility of migrant workers.57 There is growing 
attention to the use of predatory recruitment fees and debts imposed by employers as 
mechanisms that prevent migrant workers from leaving exploitative labour situations. 
However, debt is relevant to a much wider set of workers and business practices than is 
typically acknowledged in the literature. Debt is a key marker of vulnerability to forced labour 
amongst non-migrant workers, too, as my study of tea plantation business models makes clear.  
Across the spectrum of forced and so-called free labour relations, debt shapes workers’ 
experiences within labour markets, on worksites, and their ability to exit labour exploitation.58 
As such, the level of debt of workforces within their global supply chains is a key factor that 
MNCs should take into account when assessing vulnerability to forced labour.  
 
C. Modern Slavery Reporting and Commercial Practices 
Most research to date on corporate modern slavery reporting has focused on whether 
and to what extent companies have complied with reporting requirements; in other words, do 
they tick the boxes required by relevant legislation. However, there is a need to move beyond 
technical assessment of compliance to look at whether companies are reporting relevant and 
meaningful information, and whether the efforts they are taking to address and prevent forced 
labour in supply chains is leading to the types of changes that are essential to eradicating these 
practices. The indicators most relevant to forced labour that companies could be reporting on 
are around wages, prices paid to suppliers, purchasing practices, and whether they are willing 
to absorb increases in minimum wages. Yet, these sorts of topics are all but totally absent from 
reporting under the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act and similar laws, which tend to focus on 
philanthropic and voluntary corporate social responsibility programs like social auditing and 
ethical certification rather than commercial practices. If companies have any hope of ending 
the prevailing dynamics wherein they are undermining their own anti-slavery initiatives by 
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sourcing below the costs of production, they need to start incorporating metrics around wages 
and prices into their modern slavery reporting. 
 
D. Living Wages as a Protective Factor for Workers’ Human Rights in Supply 
Chains 
Just as we know that low wages and wage violations leave workers vulnerable to more 
severe forms of abuse, living wages offer workers protection from forced labour. Take the 
examples of tea and cocoa workers discussed earlier in this article. If employers had routinely 
paid workers living wages, they would have had no need to borrow to cover costs of basic 
essentials like food, healthcare, and education for their children. They would have had savings 
to draw on to respond to emergencies, eliminating the need for high-interest loans. They would 
have the resources they need to survive while fleeing abusive labour conditions. In many cases, 
exit from forced labour is precluded by a lack of financial resources; but living wages would 
give workers the resources and power necessary to exit situations of forced labour. For this 
reason, scholarship interested in how business and human rights can be promoted in supply 
chains should centre living wages as a key protective factor and strategy to address key root 
causes of vulnerability and abuse. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Forced labour is often depicted as an anomalous crime, as something that happens when a 
worker is unlucky or deceived in an industry where workers are otherwise doing fine and 
businesses are acting responsibly. But our research shows, by contrast, that portions of supply 
chains in which wages are low, wage violations are rampant, and suppliers are under serious 
pressure to minimise costs, give rise to forced labour. These basic dimensions of business 
conduct need to be reprioritised within academic and policy discussions of forced labour and 
strategies to combat it. Not only are decent wages and the commercial conditions that support 
them prerequisites to ensuring human rights within supply chains, but they are fundamental 
to giving workers the ability to exit and exercise their rights when they face abuse.   
 Business and human rights scholarship focuses considerable attention today on things 
businesses can do to respect human rights in supply chains, from complex benchmarking 
systems to new models of financial investment. However, the literature would benefit from 
far greater attention to the mundane yet vastly important practices that are most within 
businesses’ control and scope to change: wages (and the deductions, dynamics of credit and 
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debt that frequently accompany them); commercial and sourcing practices; business to 
business relationships within supply chains; uneven value distribution along supply chains 
(including between firms, countries, and executives to workers); and adherence to labour 
laws and standards. Unless there is certainty that business models and supply chains are not 
configured to give rise to forced labour, there is little point finessing CSR programs and tools 
to track and monitor labour standards and rights in supply chains. Future studies of forced 
labour, and human and labour rights in supply chains more broadly, would benefit from 
empirical investigation of this underlying architecture, and especially of wages. Researching 
forced labour in this way requires scholars to transcend the binary conceptualisation that 
typically underpins scholarship on forced labour in supply chains, both surrounding 
understandings of worker freedom and unfreedom, and the (il)legality of businesses that use 









Table 1 – Worker Interviewees 
No. Interviewee Region 
1 Tea workers 1-30 Assam 
2 Tea workers 31-61 Kerala 
3 Cocoa workers 1-30 Ashanti 
4 Cocoa workers 31-60 Western 
 
 
Table 2 – Domestic Business Actor Interviewees  
 
No. Interviewee Industry 
1 Workers coop outreach 
officer 1 
Cocoa 




7 Director of certifier 10 Tea 
8-9 Managers 1 & 4 (factory) Tea 
10-11 Managers 2 & 3 (estates)  Tea 
12 Manager 5 (industry 
association) 
Tea 
13 Estate owner 1 Tea 
14-17 Industry association 
representatives 7, 8 & 11 
Cocoa 
18 Industry association 
representative 10 
Cocoa & tea 
19-20 Cocoa buyer 1-2 Cocoa 
21-22 Cocoa seller 1-2 Cocoa 
23-24 Cocoa buyer managers 3-4 Cocoa 
 
 
